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Abstract 
We study the connection between kappa cal­
culus and probabilistic reasoning in diagnosis 
applications. Specifically, we abstract a prob­
abilistic belief network for diagnosing faults 
into a kappa network and compare the order­
ing of faults computed using both methods. 
We show that, at least for the example exam­
ined, the ordering of faults coincide as long as 
all the causal relations in the original prob­
abilistic network are taken into account. We 
also provide a formal analysis of some net­
work structures where the two methods will 
differ. 
Both kappa rankings and infinitesimal prob­
abilities have been used extensively to study 
default reasoning and belief revision. But lit­
tle has been done on utilizing their connec­
tion as outlined above. This is partly be­
cause the relation between kappa and prob­
ability calculi assumes that probabilities are 
arbitrarily close to one (or zero). The exper­
iments in this paper investigate this relation 
when this assumption is not satisfied. The 
reported results have important implications 
on the use of kappa rankings to enhance the 
knowledge engineering of uncertainty models. 
1 Introduction 
Bayesian reasoning has found widespread use in re­
cent years [12]. Applications based on Bayesian net­
works, for example, have spanned over diagnosis, fore­
casting, natural language understanding, and planning 
[1]. But despite the popularity of Bayesian methods, 
one of their key aspects has always stood in their way 
to further success and wider use; namely, their com­
mitment to point probabilities. In particular, most 
Bayesian techniques cannot commence without com­
mitting a domain expert to a full probability distri­
bution, which typically requires many probabilities to 
be specified. Although recent advances in Bayesian 
networks have reduced this problem by appealing to 
conditional independences, there is still a significant 
interest in reducing this problem even further given its 
impact on knowledge elicitation and model building. 
In recent years, a number of proposals have been ex­
tended for the purpose of relieving domain experts 
from having to specify point probabilities. Many 
of these proposals offer concrete methods that allow 
Bayesian reasoning to commence without a commit­
ment to a complete probability distribution. An exam­
ple of this is Qualitative Probabilistic Networks [18], 
which allow one to reason about probabilistic influ­
ences among variables in a qualitative manner that is 
consistent with Bayesian reasoning. A second class 
of proposals attempts to relief experts from providing 
point probabilities by requiring more abstract and in­
tuitive belief measures that are consistent with point 
probabilities. A key proposal in this camp is kappa cal­
culus [16, 17] and its probabilistic interpretation using 
€-semantics [8). In this framework, experts can pro­
vide beliefs in the form of if-then rules that are quan­
tified using order-of-magnitude probabilities. This 
quantification can be naturally embedded into a causal 
network, where the same set of Bayesian distributed 
algorithms can be applied [10, 2]. 
Both kappa calculus and its probabilistic interpreta­
tion have been extensively studied from the perspec­
tive of belief revision, nonmonotonic and defeasible 
reasoning [2, 8, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 15]. Kappa calculus 
was also proposed as a qualitative version of proba­
bilistic reasoning in [9]. Yet, the formal relation be­
tween kappa calculus and probabilistic reasoning is es­
tablished under the assumption that probabilities are 
extreme; that is, not only should they be close to one 
or zero but also they should be arbitrarily so. This 
requirement, which is never met in practice, means 
that kappa calculus can be viewed as an abstraction 
of probability calculus under the following acceptance 
rule [7] : Even though probabilities may not be arbi­
trarily extreme, the agent is willing to assume and be­
have as if they were, thus transforming them into plain 
beliefs quantified by kappa rankings that can be ma­
nipulated using kappa calculus . 
The question we address in this paper is the follow-
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ing: What are the consequences of adopting the ac­
ceptance rule? For example, what information is lost 
once we are willing to take regular probabilities and 
abstract them into plain beliefs to be processed by 
kappa calculus? To answer these questions, we take 
an empirical approach and use a diagnostic example 
to test our hypothesis. Our results show that in spite 
of differences in absolute beliefs, when it comes to or­
dering the set of faults, both standard probabilities 
and their corresponding kappa rankings coincide most 
of the time. Moreover, an analysis of the differences 
between the two calculi led us to identify two causal 
structures where using probabilities or kappa rankings 
will yield different results. 
The results in this paper are important for the knowl­
edge engineering of uncertainty models for the follow­
ing reasons: 
1. Eliciting and building uncertainty models seems 
to be an easier task in kappa calculus than in 
probabilities. The kappa quantification of a net­
work can be performed using if-then rules and 
ignorance can be specified by declaring that both 
an event and its negation are possible. 
2. Models are more robust in kappa calculus, since 
small changes in the uncertainty will not affect 
much the assignment of beliefs. 
3. It seems easier to absorb the results of a proba­
bilistic inference once they are displayed as order­
of-magnitude approximations (kappa rankings) of 
the actual probabilities. 
4. There are indicators that algorithms based on ex­
treme probabilities [13] and kappa rankings [9] can 
be faster than those based on regular probabili­
ties. 
This paper is structured as follows. We overview kappa 
calculus in Section 2 and then elaborate on its relation 
with probability calculus in Section 3. Specifically, al­
though kappa calculus has been developed indepen­
dently of probability calculus, kappa rankings can 
be viewed as order-of-magnitude probabilities when 
these probabilities are arbitrarily high or low. In Sec­
tion 3, we provide a formal translation from point 
probabilities to kappa rankings and outline the role 
that this translation could play in practical systems, 
where probabilities are not necessarily extreme. We 
then report a number of experiments in Section 4 that 
are designed to evaluate the proposed translation and 
to assess the possible loss of information it could lead 
to. The experiments are conducted in the context of a 
diagnosis task. Some of the reported results lend them­
selves to formal analysis that we carry out in Section 5. 
The key outcome of this analysis is an intuitive char­
acterization of kappa calculus on some of the causal 
structures appearing in real world applications. Fi­
nally, Section 6 summarizes the main results and offers 
another perspective on the connection between proba­
bilities and kappa rankings according to which kappa 
rankings are strengths of default assumptions that are 
extracted from probabilistic information. This connec­
tion is in the spirit of earlier work on extreme prob­
abilities and t-semantics [12] and provides a better 
understanding of the connection between point prob­
abilities, kappa rankings and default priorities. 
2 Kappa calculus 
The original motivation behind kappa calculus was to 
propose a non-probabilistic theory of inductive rea­
soning [16, 17]. A non-probabilistic theory was sought 
because inductive reasoning involves classifying propo­
sitions according to whether they are believed or dis­
believed and then changing this classification upon re­
ceiving further information. But classical probability 
theory did not support such a classification: proposi­
tions are only graded by their probabilities and are not 
classified into believed/ disbelieved/uncommitted. 
Given this motivation, the properties of kappa calculus 
can be justified without having to appeal to a proba­
bilistic interpretation, which is how the calculus was 
argued for in [16]. There, a state of belief is repre­
sented by a ranking K that maps propositions into the 
class of ordinals such that 
1. K(true) = 0, 
2. K(a V {3) = min(K(a), ��:({3)) .  
A rule was also given for conditioning a state of belief 
K on evidence J..L: 
��:(a I p.):::: K(a Ap.)- K(J.L). 
According to kappa calculus, a proposition a is be­
lieved to degree s if K( ..,a) = s; is disbelieved to degree 
s if K(a) = s; and is uncommitted if K(a) =,..;(-,a) = 0. 
Moreover, the strengths of these beliefs decide which of 
them are retracted when accommodating a disbelieved 
evidence. 
Kappa calculus then offers a framework for reasoning 
with defeasible beliefs, where the kappa rankings play 
the role of default priorities [10, 11]. But the calculus 
is analogous to probability calculus in the sense that 
it provides a similar machinery: a definition of a state 
of belief and a definition of conditionalization for ac­
commodating evidence. This correspondence should 
not be surprising, however, given the symbolic gener­
alization of probability theory in [4], which provides 
definitions for abstract states of belief and abstract 
conditionalization that subsume both probability and 
kappa calculi (see [14] also for a generalization of belief 
functions that subsumes kappa rankings). 
3 Kappas and probabilities 
Although Spohn has motivated kappa calculus as a 
theory of belief change, Spohn also noted the con­
nection between kappas and nonstandard probabilities 
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Figure 1: The car network. 
[16, 17]. The purpose was mainly to explain the sym­
metry between properties of kappa calculus and laws of 
probability theory. In particular, Spohn suggested in 
[16] a mapping from probability distributions to kappa 
rankings that justifies the properties of kappa calculus. 
He proposed mapping each probability Pr( a I {3) into 
a ranking k such that Pr(o: I {3)/<k is finite but not in­
finitesimal for an infinitesimal f. Spohn then showed 
that we get the following: 
1. ��:(a V ;3) =min(��:( a), ��::(/3)), 
2. ��:(a I /3) =��:(a: A/3)- ��::(/3), 
which are the basic properties of kappa rankings. This 
result provides an interpretation of kappa rankings 
as order-of-magnitude approximations of probabilities 
through the following relation: 
f<pjfk�1, 
which is equivalent to fk+l < p � fk. 
(1) 
This connection between kappa rankings and proba­
bilities is of great theoretical interest. For example, 
its role has been explored at length in providing prob­
abilistic semantics to defeasible if-then rules that are 
crucial to nonmonotonic reasoning [8]. But the con­
nection between kappas and probabilities is also im­
portant from a purely probabilistic sense. That is, 
a key concern of Bayesian practitioners, for example, 
is to continue to enjoy the merits of Bayesian tech­
niques while committing as little as possible to point 
probabilities. The view of kappa rankings as order­
of-magnitudes probabilities is one way to satisfy this 
need. That is, instead of providing point probabilities, 
one provides kappa rankings. In fact, the role of such a 
connection goes beyond the knowledge elicitation pro­
cess to at least two other areas: 
1. Given probabilities that result from answering a 
query, we can map these probabilities into kappa 
rankings before we present them to experts or be­
fore we use them as inputs to other reasoning pro­
cesses such as decision making. 
2. Given a set of probabilities to be computed with, 
we can map these into kappas and then use kappa­
specific algorithms for the computation. This step 
is significant if kappa-specific algorithms turn out 
to be more efficient than probabilistic ones, a hope 
that is being backed by recent results [13, 9]. 
One should emphasize though that the above connec­
tion between kappas and probabilities rests on assum­
ing that f is infinitesimal. Given a probability distri­
bution, for example, the following two computations 
will yield the same results when an infinitesimal f is 
used: 
(C1) Computing posterior probabilities using probabil­
ity calculus and then abstracting them into kappa 
rankings. 
(C2) Abstracting probabilities into kappa rankings and 
then computing posterior kappa rankings using 
kappa calculus. 
But unless probabilities are arbitrarily high or low, 
computations C1 and C2 will be equal in a trivial 
sense. For example, if all probabilities are known to 
be between .05 and .95, the mapping of Equation 1 
will produce a zero kappa for each given probability. 
This means that the resulting kappa distribution will 
be trivial; all it says is that everything is possible and 
that nothing is believed or disbelieved. 
Therefore, we are constrained in practice to select a 
noninfinitesimal E to use in Equation 1. There will al­
ways be tension between how close the value of t is 
to zero and how close the results of computations C1 
and C2 will be. On one extreme, f is very close to 
zero and the results of Cl equal those of C2 but pos­
sibly in a trivial sense because the generated kappa 
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1. If p = 0, then print oo. 
2. k- 0. 
3. p +- pfc 
4. If p > 1, then print k otherwise k +- k + 1. 
5. Goto 3. 
Figure 2: A procedure for translating a probability 
value p into a kappa value k by finding a solution to 
the equation <k+1 < p ::.; t:k. 
rankings may have lost most of the probabilistic infor­
mation. On the other extreme, < is not close to zero, 
the resulting kappa rankings are not trivial, but the 
results could be different from those obtained using 
probability calculus. The experiments in the next sec­
tion will assess the discrepancies between the results of 
kappa calculus and those of probability calculus when 
< is not infinitesimal, using two different measures of 
discrepancy. Section 5 will then offer a formal analy­
sis of these results by identifying cases in which such 
discrepancies are expected. 
4 Experimental results 
To empirically study the connection between kappa 
calculus and probabilistic reasoning in those instances 
were <. is not infinitesimal, we conducted a set of exper­
iments with different values of<. and different evidence. 
These experiments were performed on a probabilistic 
causal network for diagnostic reasoning about faults 
in a car. The network is depicted in Figure 1.1 Each 
experiment involved setting the value of<, providing 
observations in the form of evidence, evaluating the 
probabilistic network using probability calculus, trans­
lating the probabilistic network into a kappa network 
using the procedure in Figure 2, and then evaluating 
the resulting kappa network using kappa calculus. 
We conducted three sets of experiments for < = 0.2, 
c:: = 0.02, and<= 0.002. We report below (see Tables 1 
and 2) on the most representative results of the simi­
larities and differences between kappa and probabilis­
tic inference. The observables where engine-start, 
gas-gauge, lights, and engine-turn-over, while 
the faults where alternator, battery, fuel-pump, 
gas, plugs and starter. The value of engine-start 
was always set to BO. 
To assess the discrepancies between kappa and proba­
bility computations, we used the following two criteria: 
1. Ordering of faults: In Table 1 we order the faults 
according to their corresponding probabilities and 
kappas. The table contains eight "runs", where a 
run is defined by an instantiation of the evidence. 
The first line in each run corresponds to the or­
dering of faults according to their probabilistic de-
1This network was obtained from the Bayesian group at 
Microsoft Research. 
grees of belief. The second line corresponds to the 
ordering of faults when c:: = 0.2 and the third line 
to<.= 0.02. 
2. Degrees of Belief" In Table 2 we compare the 
probabilities of faults to their kappa rankings 
by transforming the posterior probabilities into 
kappa rankings following the procedure in Fig­
ure 2 and using <. = 0.02. 
The first criterion provides a practical measure of the 
correspondence between kappa and probabilistic infer­
ence when the kappa network is generated automati­
cally from a probabilistic one. The second criterion is 
intended to compare the results of computations Cl 
and C2 in Section 3 when <. is not infinitesimal. 
All of the experiments reported here were conducted 
using CNETS [3]: an experimental tool for represent­
ing and reasoning with generalized causal networks [2], 
which include kappa and probabilistic causal networks 
as special instances. 
We have the following observations about the reported 
results: 
Ordering of the faults 
When c:: = 0.2, the ordering of faults according to prob­
abilities and kappas is the same in all the runs, pro­
vided we break ties in a particular manner. Ties in the 
kappa case are expected given that they represent an 
abstraction of the real probabilistic value. 
When c:: = 0.02, the results are also very close, except 
that the most likely fault and the second most likely 
fault are inverted in runs 2,4 and 6. The discrepancies 
in these runs are due to the same reason: loss of in­
formation due to the kappa abstraction. In particular, 
the matrix quantifying engine-starts contains four 
rows in which the kappa of engine-starts and the 
kappa of its negation are both zeros. That is, there 
are four rows in which the matrix does not commit 
to whether engine-starts is believed or disbelieved. 
But when <. = 0.2, the matrix of engine-starts com­
mits to whether engine-starts is believed or disbe­
lieved in each row. 
Degrees of belief in faults 
Note that probabilities and kappas disagree more no­
ticeably in belief strengths than in the ordering of 
faults. Kappas are generally much more committed 
to assign stronger beliefs to the possible existence of 
faults than probability. This property is illustrated in 
Figures 4, 5, and 6, where kappa beliefs are sharp and 
linear. These figures will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 5. 
The disagreement of belief strength in Table 2 
prompted the formal analysis in Section 5. We 
basically identified two causal structures, a chain 
and a fork - see Figure 3. The chain struc­
ture was motivated by the discrepancies on the de-
GAS GAUGE . 
1 NOT.EMPTY 
2 EMPTY 
3 NOT-EMPTY 
4 EMPTY 
!> NOT·EMPTY 
6 EMPTY 
7 NOT-EMPTY 
8 EMPTY 
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LIGHTS TURN OVER Calcuh . 
WORK YES Pr 
�t:=0.2 
"•=0.02 
WORK YES Pr 
"€=0.2 
"<=0.02 
WORK NO Pr 
Kt:=0.2 
"•=0.02 
WORK NO Pr 
.1'(�=0.2 
"•=0.02 
DONT YES Pr 
.K€�0.2 
"<=0.02 
DONT YES Pr 
K-!:0.2 
"•=0.02 
DONT NO Pr 
1'((=0.2 
Ke-=0.02 
DONT NO Pr 
K-e-:0.2 
�e-=0.02 
.Fuel-Pump 
Fuel-Pump· 
Fuel-Pump 
G..s 
Gall' 
Fuel-PumpT 
Fuel-Pump 
�·ueJ-t'ump 
Fuel-Pump' 
Ga• 
a .... 
Fuel-Pump· 
Fuel-Pump 
Fuel-Pump 
Aherna.tor 
Battery 
Fuel-PumpT 
Ga.s 
Ga.s· 
Fuel-Pump 
Alternator 
Alternator· ' 
Ba.llery · 
Altetna.t:or· ' 
Ba.llery · ' 
Fuel-Pump· 
Balle ry 
Bal lery · ' 
AUerna.t.or· 
Ba.Uery· ' 
Alternator· 
Fuel-Pump? 
Ordenn� 
Plug• Alterna.tor Su.rter Ga• Ba.Uery 
Plugs Altoernator Sta.rter 
Gas 
Battery 
Plug• St a.rter 
Aherna.tor Gas 
Battery 
Fuel-Pump Plug• Aherna.\or Ballery 
Sta.r &er 
Fuel-Pump Plu� Alternator BaUery 
Sta.rter 
Ga.• Plu�• Ba.ttery 
Alternator Starter 
Starter Plugs Aherna.tor Ba.ttery 
G ... 
�ta.rter Alternator J;>a.ltery 
Plugs Gas 
Sta.rter Alternator Battery 
Plugs Ga.s 
Fuel-Pump Sta.rter Plug• Ah erna.\or Battery 
Fuel-Pump St.a.rE�r Allerna.to.r Battery 
Plu��:s 
Ga.;; Alterna.tor Battery 
Sia.rler 
PluK• 
Aherna.tor Bauoery Plug• G&S 
Starter 
Plug• G<>s 
Stiuter 
Alternator· Plug• G..., 
7 
Eai.tery' Sta.rter 
Fuel-Pump Alternator Battery P lugs Starter 
Fuel-Pump Plugs Starter 
Alternator 
Battery 
Alternator· Ga..::; Plugs Starter . 
Ba.ttery· 
Ba.uery Fuel-Pump Plugs Sta.rter G"' 
Fue1-Pump Plugs Starter Ga.• 
Plug• SU.r$:er a ..  
Alt ernator Fuel-Pu mp Plugs Gas Starter 
Fuel-Pump Plugs Ga• Sh.rler 
Plugs Gas 
Starter 
Table 1: Ordering of faults according to ( 1) posterior probabilities that resulted from evaluating the probabilistic 
car network and (2) posterior kappa rankings that resulted from evaluating the kappa car network. A "+" means 
believed and a "?" means uncommitted. 
GAS-GAUGE LIGHTS TUKN-OVER Battery Aherna.tor Sta.rter gao Fuel-Pump Pl ugs 
" r " Pr " Pr " Pr " <'r " r 
NOT-EMPTY WORK YES ok ok ok ok* ok ok ok ok bad ? ok ok* 
EMPTY WORK YES ok ok ok ok* ok ok ok ? bad ' ok ok* 
NOT-EMPTY WORK NO ok ok ok ok* ok ok ok ok ? ? ok ok 
EMPTY WORK NO ok ok ok ok* ok ok ok ? ? ' ok ok 
NOT-EMPTY DONT YES ? ok ? ok ok ok ok ok bad ? ok* ok 
EMPTY DONT YES ' ok ? ok* ok ok ok ? bad ? ok* ok 
NOT-EMPTY DONT NO ' 7 ? 7 ok ok ok ok ? ? ok ok 
EMPTY DONT NO ? ? ? ? ok ok ok* ok ? ? ok ok 
Table 2: Comparing ( 1) kappa rankings that are abstracted from posterior probabilities that resulted from 
evaluating the probabilistic car network to (2) posterior kappa rankings that resulted from evaluating the kappa 
car network. A "*" indicates a difference between the two kappa rankings. A "?" indicates that the kappa 
ranking of a fault and that of its negation were zeros, thus leading to ignorance about whether the fault is 
present. 
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Xl X2 Xn 
0-----0 -------� 
(a) 
Xl X2 
y 
X3 
(b) 
Xn 
Figure 3: (a) Chain network, and (b) Fork network. 
grees of belief in the subnetwork involving the nodes 
alternator, charge-delivered and battery-power. 
The fork structure was motivated by the discrepan­
cies involving the subnetwork composed of the nodes 
battery power, lights, radio, engine-turn-over, 
and gas-gauge. 
It is important to point out that even though the 
strength of belief between probabilities and kappas 
does not always coincide, the most plausible faults do 
agree. This suggests that the precise numbers may not 
be relevant if we dim them for the purposes of optimal 
recommendations regarding repair and actions. 
5 Formal Analysis 
The discrepancies we obtained in the previous experi­
ments prompted the characterization of network con­
figurations on which the use of kappa calculus leads to 
different results from probability calculus. In partic­
ular, we have identified two network structures where 
we can characterize such a discrepancy and analyze 
it intuitively. The first structure is that of a chain 
of variables and is discussed in Section 5.1. The sec­
ond structure is that of a fork and is discussed in Sec­
tion 5.2. 
5.1 Propagation in chains 
Consider the chain in Figure 3a, where all variables 
are assumed to be binary with values xi (true) and 
x;- (false). Suppose that the causal links are quantified 
as follows: Pr[xj] = 0.5, Pr[xt I X;�1] = 0.8, and 
P[xi I xj""_1] = 0.2. Suppose further that we observe 
variable X 1 to be true. What can we conclude about 
the probability that a descendant X; is true? 
According to probability calculus, the probability that 
any descendant xi is true will increase after observing 
that X 1 is true. Moreover, such increase will depend 
on how far X; is from X 1. In kappa calculus, however, 
we get a different behavior. That is, if we transform 
the previous probabilistic chain to a kappa chain using 
t = 0.2, we get the quantification: !i:[xiJ = K[xiJ = 0, 
K[x;-lxi-d = 1 and !i:[xilx;-_Jl = 1. Moreover, after 
observing that X 1 is true, each following X; will be 
believed true but with the same strength. That is, 
the strength of belief is independent of how far xi is 
from X1, contrary to the probabilistic case. Figure 4 
shows the difference between kappa and probability 
calculi with respect to the previous quantification of 
the chain. 
In general though, the propagation of belief from vari­
able X1 to variable X1 in such a network is governed 
probabilistically by the following equation: 
P[x;lxi] = I: IJ P[xkiXk-1]. (2) 
X2, ... ,Xi-l k=2 
In contrast, kappa calculus leads to the following equa­
tion: 
i 
K[x;lxl] = min L K[xklxk-1]· (3) 
X'2,---,Xi-1 k=2 
The kappa ranking corresponding to the result of 
Equation 2 should be equal to the result of Equation 3 
when kappa rankings are generated using an infinites­
imal t. In the experiments of Section 4, however, we 
used real valued t, which prompted the difference in 
the degrees of belief in Table 2. 
5.2 Fusion in forks 
Consider the network in Figure 3b, where all vari­
ables are also assumed to be binary. Suppose that the 
causal links are quantified as follows: P[y+] = 0.04, 
P[xtly+] = 0.8 and P[xtiY-] = 0.2. Suppose further 
that we observe variables X 1 through Xi to be true. 
What can we conclude about the probability that Xn 
is true? 
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Belief 
1 
0.95 
0.9 
0.85 
0.8 
0.75 
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0.65 
0.6 
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P[Xn1X1] 
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K[Xn!X1) 
11 13 15 
Number of nodes 
Figure 4: The horizontal axis represents i � 1, the 
distance between variables X; and X1 in Figure 3a. 
The vertical axis represents the belief that X; is true. 
In the probabilistic case, we expect that the previous 
evidence will increase the probability in Xn being true. 
After all, the evidence increases the belief in Y being 
true, which translates into an increase in the proba­
bility of Xn being true. Moreover, the increase in the 
probability of Xn depends on the number of observed 
variables X11 ... , X;. That is, the bigger i is, the big­
ger the increase in the probability of Xn. Figure 5 
supports this intuition by plotting the increase for a 
specific quantification of the network. 
In the kappa case, however, observing the truth of ef­
fects X 1, . . . , X; changes the belief in Xn but in a dif­
ferent manner as depicted in Figure 6. That is, choos­
ing the quantification: K[y+] = 5, K[xi IY+] = 1 and 
K[xt IY-] = 1 leads to the following. First, if the num­
ber of observations is less than five, Xn is believed 
to be false. In case of six observations, Xn is neither 
believed true nor false. But as we collect more observa­
tions, Xn is then believed to be true, but the strength 
of this belief is not affected by the number of further 
observations. 
The reason for this behavior stems from the following 
observation about kappa calculus. The belief in xt 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Degree of 
Belief 
2 3 4 5 6 
P[YIEvid) 
P[Xn!Evid) 
7 8 9 10 
Number of 
evidence nodes 
Figure 5: The horizontal axis represents i, the num­
ber of observed effects X 1 ,  . . .  , X; in Figure 3b. The 
vertical axis represents the probabilities of Y and Xn 
being true. 
is affected by both the strength of y+ 's causal effect 
on xt and by the strength of believing in y+. But the 
strength of believing in y+ will be relevant only as long 
as it is no stronger than the causal effect. Once the 
belief in y+ exceeds the strength of this causal effect, 
its exact value does not matter: 
which leads to K[x�] = min(l + K[y+], K[y-]) and 
K[xt] = min(K[y+J, 1 + K(y-]) in the above quantifica­
tion. That is, if y+ is unknown, then xt is unknown; 
if y+ is believed to degree 1, xt is believed to degree 1; 
if y+ is believed to degree 2, xt is believed to degree 
1; and so on. Now, as we obtain more observations 
about the effects of Y, our belief in it increases, but 
that does not affect the belief in Xn as shown above. 
In general, the equations governing the propagation of 
belief both in the case of probabilities and kappas are 
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4 
3 
Degree of 
Belief 
2 
2 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
-5 
K[YIEvid) 
8 10 
Number of 
evidence nodes 
Figure 6: The horizontal axis represents i, the number 
of observed effects X1, ... , X; in Figure 3b. T he verti­
cal axis represents ��:[z-}-��:[z+J for z = y and z = Xto. 
If ��:(z-]- ��:[z+] is positive, then z+ is believed; if it 
is negative, then z+ is disbelieved; otherwise, z+ is 
unknown. 
given below: 
= a L P[xniY] IT P[xkJy]P[y], 
ing a kappa causal network that can be processed us­
ing kappa calculus. To adopt this practice, however, 
one must first provide answers to a number of ques­
tions. First, would kappa rankings keep us in the 
realm of probability theory, the properties of which 
have led to the popularity of probabilistic causal net­
works in the first place? Would kappa networks allow 
the same expressiveness that one expects from proba­
bilistic causal networks? What should be done about 
the large body of existing probabilistic networks? Can 
these be mapped into kappa networks using some for­
mal procedure? Would the resulting networks capture 
the information represented by the original probabilis­
tic networks? And so on. 
In this paper, we attempted to answer some of the 
above questions by (1) proposing a concrete mapping 
from probabilities to kappa rankings that does not re­
quire probabilities to be infinitesimal; (2) conducting 
an empirical study to assess the proposed mapping and 
to illustrate the expressiveness of kappa models in cap­
turing diagnostic information; (3) providing some for­
mal analysis of the connection between certain classes 
of probabilistic and kappa causal networks. The basic 
conclusion we have reached is that one may abstract 
a probabilistic network into a kappa network and still 
retain strong inferences. But our study also suggests 
that more needs to be said about when key inferences 
are retained. 
The discrepancies obtained in inferences using proba­
bilistic methods and kappa calculus should not be too 
surprising. Kappa calculus was proposed initially as a 
calculus for defeasible reasoning in which kappa rank­
ings are interpreted as default priorities. As such, the 
calculus has been argued for convincingly in (16], has 
been shown to subsume many of the proposed calculi 
for defeasible reasoning in [6, 8], and has also con­
tributed to the formalization of belief revision patterns y k=l 
. that were not accounted for in the belief revision lit-
] b · [ � I ] [ ] erature (5]. The calculus, therefore, seems to be very ��:[xniXt, · · · ' X; = + mJn II: Xn IY] + � K[Xk Y + K Y 'intuitive from a defeasible reasoning perspective and 
k=I the inferences it leads to seem to be well justified. The 
where a and b are normalization constants. As ex- discrepancies with probability calculus, and their rela-
pected, in the case of probabilities, changes in the de- tion, can then be explained as follows. Kappa calcu-
gree of belief of Xn will be gradual and cumulative Ius as a method for defeasible reasoning manipulates 
as new evidence on its sibling nodes is gathered. In prioritized beliefs, which can be extracted from prob-
contrast, the propagation of beliefs in the case of the abilistic information as suggested in Section 3. Yet, 
kappa case will be abrupt and sharp. default priorities are less informative and capture less 
information than probabilities. Nevertheless, people 
6 Discussion 
The use of probabilistic causal networks in diagnosis 
applications has become very common in recent years. 
One obstacle in this process, however, is the need to 
quantify causal relationships using point probabilities. 
Most often, probabilities are hard to assess and when 
they are provided, they seem to be too detailed for 
the reasoning tasks they are used to support. One 
possibility for simplifying this process is to quantify 
causal relationships using kappa rankings, thus indue-
seem to perform this kind of abstraction all the time, 
in spite of the possible loss of information. Most of 
our beliefs are probabilistic in nature but they get 
abstracted into default assumptions for various rea­
sons, such as communicating them to others, index­
ing them efficiently, and simplifying their assessments. 
Thus, although the inferences made by kappa calcu­
lus can be well justified from the perspective of "plain 
beliefs" and "defeasible reasoning" , they can disagree 
with probabilistic inferences. 
The work in this paper takes the first steps towards 
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answering questions of a bigger scope such as: When 
should we abstract probabilities into kappa rankings; 
for what purpose; and for what cost/gain? In this 
regard, we intend to continue this project in two di� 
rections. The first one concerns the process of de� 
cision making. The fact that the orders of faults 
were very similar in both probabilities and kappas 
suggests that the recommendations for repair should 
also be very similar. We intend to conduct a similar 
study to compare a probabilistic and a kappa decision 
making approach. The second direction concerns the 
computational value of abstracting probabilities into 
kappa rankings. The behavior of kappas in chains and 
forks suggest that the notion of belief acceptance in 
kappa calculus may yield a notion of weak indepen� 
dence where belief in a node may be enough to render 
other nodes independent in the network.2 Our hope is 
that this property will translate into new algorithms 
with definite computational gains. 
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